Why Is America Scared of TikTok

Why Is America Scared of TikTok, Which Is Owned By US Investors?

In regions where the app, TikTok, is allowed to be used, it has been a runaway success. The social media app dedicated to short-form videos that are user-generated has more than a billion active monthly users and TikTok’s format lends itself to entertainment and comedy. Of late, however, it is increasingly being used for other purposes – news, infotainment, and marketing promotions.

The largest number of TikTok users is in the US where it is estimated to have 170 million users (a sizeable proportion of the country’s population of 332 million). Other countries with significant user bases include Indonesia (110 million), Brazil (82 million), and Mexico (58 million). Last week, however, the US House of Representatives approved and passed a bill that could potentially force TikTok’s parent, the Chinese company, ByteDance, to either sell the app or face a partial ban within the US.

In fact, TikTok is already banned in many countries, including in India where, in 2020, the Indian government banned it along with dozens of other Chinese-made apps. The reasons cited for the ban were concerns related to sovereignty, integrity, defence, security, and public order. At the time of the ban, India had an estimated 200 million active users and was the largest market for the app.

Tik Tok is also banned in Afghanistan where the ruling Islamist regime felt the platform’s content was not in line with Islamic laws. In countries such as Australia, Canada, Belgium, and Denmark, the app is banned on all government-owned or government-issued devices. In the European Union, its three main institutions—the European Parliament, European Commission, and EU Council—have imposed bans on TikTok for staff devices, and the EU remains cautious about the platform’s ties to China.

In the US, legislators’ worries about TikTok have intensified after the tensions between the US and China have escalated. Many legislators believe that TikTok’s addictive algorithm could allow the Chinese government to access user data and potentially influence Americans. The bill aims to cut off Chinese influence by selling TikTok to a “qualified buyer,” likely a Western company. Legislators fear that ByteDance might be secretly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.

Who Really Owns TikTok?

While ByteDance denies sharing sensitive user data with the Chinese government, concerns persist. China’s history of cracking down on domestic tech firms and its censorship practices raise suspicions. TikTok is popularly described as a Chinese app. And, indeed, it is owned by ByteDance, an internet technology company headquartered in Beijing, China. It was founded by two Chinese entrepreneurs, Zhang Yiming and Liang Rubo in 2012. But who really owns ByteDance?

ByteDance is called a Chinese company but 60% of it is beneficially owned by global investors such as the Carlyle Group, General Atlantic, and Susquehanna International Group–all US companies. The Carlyle Group is a global investment firm, founded in the US; General Atlantic is an American growth equity firm providing capital and strategic support for global growth companies; and Susquehanna International Group is a privately held global trading and technology firm, headquartered in the US. So, more than half of ByteDance’s equity is owned by American investment firms.

What about the rest? Roughly 20% is owned by ByteDance employees worldwide; and the remaining 20% is owned by ByteDance’s founders. TikTok’s CEO is Shou Zi Chew, also known as Chew Shou Zi, a Singaporean businessman and entrepreneur, based in the US.

Does China Influence TikTok?

As can be seen from the details of who owns TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, the Chinese government or state agencies do not have control over the company in the traditional sense, that is, through shareholding. However, the rest of the world outside China believes that there is a nuance regarding the Chinese government’s influence over social media and online platforms. While not a direct owner, a small stake (1%) in one of ByteDance’s Chinese subsidiaries is held by entities with ties to the Chinese government. This gives them some influence, but the extent is unclear. 

Then there is the geographic factor. Owing to ByteDance’s Chinese origins, many countries worry the Chinese government could pressure the company to hand over user data. TikTok maintains its US user data is stored outside of China and that its CEO who is based in the US makes key decisions. So, while the Chinese government doesn’t directly own TikTok, the ownership structure and Chinese origins raise concerns about potential government influence over user data.

Interestingly, TikTok has never been available in China, as the country has its own version of the app called Douyin, incidentally, also owned by ByteDance. While TikTok is available internationally, in China, you would find Douyin, which has been described as the country’s domestic alternative to TikTok. It is held on a different server than TikTok, which researchers have attributed to ByteDance complying with internet regulations set by the Chinese government. Douyin is available via the web, and it operates within China, subject to monitoring and censorship by the government.

It is believed that China has strict control over its media environment, both traditional and digital. China’s central government employs a combination of legal regulations, technical control, and proactive manipulation to restrict online freedom of expression.

China’s Great Firewall (officially known as the Golden Shield Project) monitors and filters internet traffic, blocking access to foreign websites and services. Authorities use libel lawsuits, arrests, and other means to force journalists, bloggers, and media organisations to self-censor.

Moreover, China emphasises the concept of “internet sovereignty”, requiring all internet users (including foreigners) to abide by Chinese laws and regulations. Chinese internet companies have to sign a pledge on self-regulation and professional ethics, imposing even stricter rules.

The heat around TikTok is, therefore, generated by concerns that its parent, ByteDance, 60% of which is controlled by investment firms that are really American, will have to comply with Chinese regulations on internet and social media platforms and that TikTok’s parent company ByteDance, could access user data for surveillance or influence campaigns. 

Doesn’t Every App Collect User Data? 

Yes, they do. Pretty much all popular apps collect user data. This can include browsing habits, location, purchase history, and even how you interact with the app itself. 

Data collection by apps is becoming more regulated, but it’s a complex issue. Laws like GDPR in Europe and CCPA in California give users more control over their data, but enforcement varies. In India, for instance, the government has been actively addressing data privacy and collection through various measures but it is still evolving. When apps collect your data, there are potential risks such as privacy intrusion but also security breaches where data can be stolen and used for malicious purposes. 

Apps and platforms such as Facebook (with a monthly user base of more than 3 billion); X (350 million); and Instagram (1.2 billion) all collect personal data that, potentially, can be used for malicious intent that TikTok is potentially suspected of. The fact is there is no evidence that any of these apps and platforms misuse the data that they collect. Then again, there is neither any evidence that TikTok does that. Ultimately, all major platforms collect a substantial amount of user data. For users, therefore, it is wise to be cautious and review the privacy settings on any app that they may be using. 

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Narendra Modi’s Southern Discomfort

Narendra Modi’s Southern Discomfort 

If you go by the media, both Indian and international, the Narendra Modi led Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory in the yet to happen parliamentary elections in India is already baked in, which is to say that it is a conclusion that has preceded the actual event. With a degree of certainty that view does not vary much, as most political sages, whether in the media or in the wise environment of every Indian living room, are sanguine that Modi and his party will win a third term in government when the elections are held and the results come out in mid-May this year.

They are probably right. Modi himself has been quoted as saying that he could “gauge the mood of the nation”, and that voters “will definitely give the NDA (the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance) more than 400 seats and the BJP at least 370 seats.” In 2019, the NDA won 353 seats, 303 of them won by the BJP on its own. That is an impressive tally but still not as massive as the 404 seats that the Congress party, led by Rajiv Gandhi, won back in 1984, after the assassination of his mother, former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Can the BJP and its allies match that feat in this year’s elections? Modi’s regime enjoys very high approval ratings. He himself is among the most popular leaders that post-Independent India has had. In fact, according to one global survey, he continues to hold the title of the world’s most popular leader, with an impressive approval rating of 76%. His regime will obviously benefit from a number of factors at this year’s polls, which are expected to begin in April.

For one, the Indian economy’s performance has been outstanding, at least in terms of macroeconomic numbers. Not only has India been the fastest growing among the world’s largest economies (its GDP of $3.2 trillion makes it the world’s fifth-largest economy), according to official figures released last week, its GDP surged 8.4% in the last three months of 2023 compared with the previous year, up from a growth of 7.6% in the June-to-September period. India has overtaken countries such as the UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Brazil, and despite challenges like demonetisation, GST reforms, and the COVID pandemic, the economy has shown remarkable resilience. Inequality and job creation remain problematic but overall the Indian economy has fared well.

Besides, the Modi government has accelerated infrastructure projects, such as impressive new highways. On average, 36 km of highways are built daily, more than triple the earlier pace. It has also doubled the capacity of solar and wind-powered energy in the past five years. The average Indian citizen has also benefited from initiatives such as Swachh Bharat (a cleanliness drive), digitisation of subsidy and social welfare benefits, as also housing for the poor, and piped water supply. The Modi regime’s foreign policy stance has improved India’s global standing and its rising stature has rubbed off on people’s national pride. 

BJP also finds support among large proportions of India’s majority community of Hindus, and actions such as the recent lavish inauguration of a temple in Ayodhya on a site where a mosque was demolished three decades ago have only strengthened that support. 

Discordant notes from the South

Still, such positive factors for the Modi government could be dampened by some disharmony. In southern India, the BJP has not fared well. Continued efforts by the BJP and its allies to increase their influence in the south have not been successful. In southern states, the BJP faces strong opposition from regional parties and the opposition’s Congress party.

In Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana, the BJP’s attempts to make political inroads have not worked out. In Tamil Nadu, the ruling party is the regional All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK); in Kerala, it is the Left Democratic Front (LDF); in Andhra Pradesh, the government is led by the regional Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP); and in Telangana, it is a Congress-led government that is in power since December 2023. In Karnataka, the only southern state where the BJP made significant inroads and ruled during 2018-2023 (save a short interruption by the Janata Party), it was dislodged last year by the Congress. 

Let’s do a bit of math. The BJP’s tally from the south in national elections has not been heartening for it either. Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Kerala, Karnataka, and Puducherry together have 130 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. In the 2019 elections, while BJP and its allies swept the northern states, in the southern states, they managed to win only 30 seats, 25 of them from Karnataka. In contrast, of the 91 seats that the Congress-led UPA won in 2019 Lok Sabha, 58 were from the southern states. The BJP’s foothold in the south is clearly weak.

There are non-political disparities between India’s northern and southern states as well. Data shows that southern Indian states consistently outperform the rest of the country in health, education, and economic opportunities. There is enough evidence to suggest that a child born in southern India is more likely to live a healthier, wealthier, and more socially impactful life compared to a child born in the north. 

Interestingly, at India’s independence in 1947, southern states (Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh) were mostly in the middle or bottom in terms of development. However, since the 1980s, southern states have diverged positively compared to the rest of India, with accelerated progress.

The combined population of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Puducherry is estimated at 250 million, representing approximately 18% of India’s population, but Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, alone has an estimated population of more than 240 million. A lower population has its advantages.

The progressiveness of the southern states and their economic performance is demonstrated by their per capita GDPs and how those stack up with the rest of India’s states and Union Territories. While, small states such as Goa, Sikkim and Delhi understandably top the list of per capita GDP rankings in India, it is significant that some of the southern states such as Telangana (at the fifth spot), Karnataka (at the sixth), Tamil Nadu (at the ninth), and Kerala (at the 11th) are way higher than, say, northern states such as Uttar Pradesh (at 32), Bihar at (33), and Madhya Pradesh (at 25).

India is likely one of the most complex countries in the world with a degree of heterogeneity across regions that is unparalleled elsewhere. The differences are sharpest between the north and the south. Besides linguistic, cultural, and traditional differences with the north, the southern states have never really accepted some aspects of the BJP’s nationalistic stance. The party is still viewed as a northern party from the Hindi belt and Hindi has never really become a part of linguistic array in the south. Not surprisingly, the BJP’s efforts to spread its influence in the southern states have largely failed.

So if we come back to the math and consider the BJP’s aim of getting 400 plus seats in the elections this year, the numbers, as the idiom says, might just not add up.

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Tricky For Journalists To Cover A War

How Tricky It Is For Journalists To Cover A War

Last week, Israel accused four freelance Gaza-based journalists who have worked with Western media outlets of having advance knowledge of the Hamas attack on October 7, which triggered the ongoing bloody conflict in Gaza. The journalists, mainly photographers, were accused of collaborating with Reuters, Associated Press, CNN, and the New York Times, all of them media outlets of considerable repute.

The accusation, made by Israeli communications minister Shlomo Karhi, was based on a report by a pro-Israeli media watchdog group, Honest Reporting, which stated that the journalists and, therefore, the organisations they were working for had prior knowledge of the horrific attacks by Hamas. In the past also, Honest Reporting has accused newspapers such as the New York Times and other western publications of an anti-Israel bias in their coverage of the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

The accusations have serious implications. In the October 7 attack, 1,200 Israelis died and more than 240 were taken hostage. It has led to a bloody battle with Israel seeking retribution by launching a full-scale attack against Hamas but the collateral damage from which has killed, displaced or injured thousands of civilians.

On their part, the four media outlets—Reuters, AP, CNN, and the New York Times—have denied any prior knowledge of the attacks. They emphasised that there were no arrangements in advance with the journalists to provide photos. The New York Times described the accusations as “untrue and outrageous,” highlighting the risk such unsupported claims pose to journalists on the ground in Israel and Gaza.

Covering wars such as the one that is ongoing in Gaza or the one that is raging for nearly two years in Ukraine after Russia attacked the country in February 2022 is fraught with risks. Of course, the primary risks that journalists face are obvious: the possibility of getting caught in the attacks, suffering injuries, or even getting killed. But there are other risks. How credible are journalists’ war-time sources?

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the picture of what is happening can vary sharply, depending on what the source is. If it is the Russian propaganda machinery, which also includes pro-Kremlin bloggers “embedded” in Russia’s military in the war zone, then you will get the pro-Russia view; if it is sourced from Ukraine, then it is likely going to be an entirely different view.

In Gaza, journalists covering the conflict face significant challenges. First, there are the restrictions. Israel has not allowed foreign journalists to enter Gaza. As a result, Western correspondents (as well as Indian media outlets that sent their representatives there) have reported extensively on the grief of Israeli families, but they miss a vital aspect of the story by not being able to witness the situation firsthand in Gaza. Without experiencing the prayers Palestinians make when they lose loved ones or learning about the life stories of those who have been killed, the coverage of Gaza remains incomplete compared to the coverage of Israel.

Israel has been steadily suppressing news reporting in the Gaza Strip. Journalists have faced danger, with some killed or wounded, media premises destroyed, and communication disruptions. There is a looming threat of an all-out media blackout in Gaza.

Journalists also face entry bans in Gaza. Since Israel blockaded the area 16 years ago, journalists cannot enter the Palestinian territory without authorisation from Israeli authorities. In addition, there could be further restrictions on Muslim journalists as three Muslim journalists from MSNBC—Mehdi Hasan, Ayman Mohieddine, and Ali Velshi—were suspended. This decision coincided with escalating tensions in the Gaza area.

On the other side too, Hamas, the ruling group in Gaza, has imposed (and later rescinded) some restrictions on journalists covering the conflict. After the recent conflict in Gaza, Hamas issued sweeping new restrictions on journalists in the Palestinian enclave. These rules included not reporting on Gazans killed by misfired Palestinian rockets; and avoiding coverage of the military capabilities of Palestinian terror groups. However, these guidelines were rescinded after discussions with authorities in Gaza. The Foreign Press Association (FPA), which represents international media, expressed that such restrictions would have been a severe limitation on press freedom and safety. Hamas confirmed the reversal and stated that there are currently no restrictions.

For journalists, trying to cover a war objectively and without bias could be an oxymoron. Most journalists are dependent on one or the other side of the warring nations. If reporters and photographers are in Israel covering what is going on in Gaza, you can expect their reports and dispatches to reflect the Israeli view of things; if they are on the other side, then the views could be quite different. Over the past nearly two years, making sense of who is making progress or suffering more losses in Ukraine has become a complex business: you either get the Russian view or the Ukrainian view, none of which might be the “true” picture.

The Cosmic Blueprint of Xi Jinping

There is a photograph that you can find with relative ease on the Internet. It shows China’s supreme leader and President Xi Jinping, flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and some two dozen top dignitaries from around the world. The photograph is from the third Belt & Road Forum for International Cooperation that was held on October 17 & 18 in Beijing.

It also marked the 10th anniversary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure and investment project announced by Xi in 2013. Many see this as part of China’s and Xi’s larger vision of a blueprint for a new world order to challenge the existing international system that it feels is unfairly skewed in favour of the United States and its allies.

Xi’s vision transcends mere governance and is more of a cosmic plan to reshape China’s role, influence, prominence, and, indeed, dominance of the world.

China was once happy to hide its capacities–economic, military, and cultural–and bide its time. It is no longer content to do so. Xi, who is on an unprecedented third term at the helm of his nation, wants to redefine the norms, dismantle existing “western biased” hierarchies and meld together a world where China’s rise is unstoppable. This vision unambiguously pervades every forum, conference, policy formulation, and international strategy that China now espouses.

The Belt & Road Forum was no different. The heads of states who attended it hailed China’s strategy and Xi’s vision. Notably, the United Nations’ Secretary General was a participant at the forefront of the forum.

For the West, Xi’s gambit resembles a tectonic shift. American wars overseas, erratic foreign policy shifts, and deep political polarisation have eroded confidence in US global leadership. Moreover, within the US, opinions, support, and allegiances are sharply polarised and divisive, raising questions there and elsewhere in the world about the relevance and effectiveness of a US-led world order. Is its approach sustainable? Can it navigate the tempests of climate change, geopolitical tensions, and humanitarian crises?

As China’s assertiveness grows, the West faces a choice: adapt or resist. Xi’s alternative model—multilateralism reframed as great-power balancing—tempts some. Yet, lurking beneath are shadows of Beijing’s iron-fisted rule—surveillance, censorship, and repression.

Where does India fit into this? Thus far, India’s approach has been cautious as it tries to balance ancient wisdom and modern ambitions. India seeks economic ties with China while guarding its strategic interests. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) looms large—an infrastructure web that binds nations but also raises sovereignty concerns. India is not a signatory to that initiative.

India’s strategy has been a sort of tightrope walk where it has tried to tango with both the West and with Beijing. It wants to harness economic opportunities from both, yet remains wary of Beijing’s territorial assertiveness and military buildup in the Indo-Pacific.

Xi’s vision does resonate with a large swathe of regions and countries around the world, including predominantly developing nations in Asia, Africa, and South America. His vision exhorts countries to forge creative coalitions—beyond simplistic divisions of democracies versus autocracies. North Korea and Iran share this stage with moderate, modernising nations. The global future, Xi suggests, demands nimble alliances.

In this scenario, India, which has had a rich history of alliances with international partners, has to traverse a shifting landscape. As the most populous nation in the world and with hundreds of millions of young people with high aspirations, India would ideally like to have a louder voice in the emerging new order, and not merely be a spectator. For that to happen, perhaps it is time for India to review its tightrope-walking style of geopolitical strategy and be more decisive.

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Indo-Pak Skirmish And Its Inevitable Political Fallout

In the early 2000s, not long after the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, which took hundreds, if not thousands of lives, but in which India claimed a decisive victory, we invited a hawkish Indian defence analyst and expert over to the magazine that I was then editing. The idea was to get his opinion on India’s preparedness for armed conflict in the region, particularly with the prevailing hostile relations with Pakistan and a potentially hostile and powerful neighbour like China. The expert (who will have to remain unnamed for now) was good. His knowledge was vast and insightful but being a hawk, his lecture and the subsequent discussions were burnished with aggressive posturing with the key point being that India was certainly in a stronger position vis-à-vis Pakistan and with greater political will it could teach an errant neighbour some hard home truths.

It was an invigorating discussion that opened up our fairly young editorial team’s minds to issues of strategy, defence, and armed conflict. But, following the talk, it was the afterglow that seemed take hold of many of my colleagues I remember vividly. Otherwise rational and perfectly reasonable young men and women strutted about the newsroom with aggressive posturing, some loudly lamenting that the Indian government was shying away from confronting Pakistan and that our armed forces should initiate military action against that nation and teach it a sound lesson.

That sort of sentiment seems to be swirling around in India now in the aftermath of the recent skirmish with Pakistan. Last month terrorists believed to be based in Pakistan suicide-bombed an Indian convoy in Kashmir and killed at least 40 security personnel. India retaliated by sending in warplanes to bomb what it claims to be a large terrorist training centre and camp in Pakistan. This was followed by an airstrike by Pakistan and dogfights in which one Indian plane was downed and a pilot captured. The pilot was released by Pakistan, which refuted India’s claims of decimating the terrorist hideout and took the high moral ground by offering peace dialogues with India over the disputed region of Kashmir.

But the main fallout of last month’s conflict was the chest-beating brand of patriotism that it spawned and the political capital that the current regime led by Mr Narendra Modi is drawing out of it. Mr Modi, his colleagues, and supporters have been proudly proclaiming the decisiveness of the Indian attack (never mind that the actual damage may have been much less than the claims that hundreds of terrorists had perished during the attack). Otherwise reasonable people in civil society as well as India’s noisy and colourful media have earned a sort of bragging rights over the skirmish, and some of them have even been baying for Pakistan’s blood. With less than a month left before millions of Indians head towards polling booths to cast their votes in the national elections, this mood is significant.

It is significant because Mr Modi, his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its allies are quite resolved to making the newest incidence of tension between India and Pakistan into an election issue. Dipstick surveys will likely show that the electorate’s faith in Mr Modi has strengthened as a consequence of the conflict. But what may be more important is the impact (or rather the lack of it) on those who politically oppose Mr Modi. In the past few months opposition leaders, including those of the Congress party and a host of other regional groupings, have been trying to forge an alliance aimed at ousting Mr Modi and his party during the coming elections. Several fault-lines, however, have emerged in that endeavour: there is no clear leader of the opposition alliance that can command support of the motley assemblage of parties; the political ambitions of several regional leaders are seen to be colliding against each other; and there is no clear-cut common electoral strategy that seems to have emerged.

More seriously, the opposition appears to be more than just a bit stumped by the wave of nationalistic fervour that Mr Modi and his alliance have drummed up. In the prevailing environment of patriotic pride and hawkishness towards Pakistan expressing any criticism (or even mild differences of opinion) is fraught with the risks of being labelled “anti-national”, which, with elections around the corner, can prove to be disastrous for anyone with political ambitions. Even mild questioning by some Congress leaders of BJP president Amit Shah’s claim that more than 250 terrorists had died in India’s bombing of a site in Pakistan led to counter-attacks by the BJP that labelled the Congress as being anti-India.

The problem for the opposition parties is compounded by the fact that little has emerged from their side in the form of a cogent, coherent strategy that can be part of their electoral campaign. In spite of a plethora of issues that have plagued the Modi regime—lack of jobs; distress in the farm sector; irregularities in a major arms deal such as the one for acquiring Rafale fighter jets from France; and growing insecurity among India’s minorities—besides criticism, the opposition parties haven’t been seen proffering their solutions for such problems. The Congress’ president, Mr Rahul Gandhi, is visibly more active politically than he has ever been. In Uttar Pradesh, a state which accounts for the largest number of seats in India’s Parliament and which will play a crucial role in deciding the outcome of the elections, the Congress has a new team—Mr Gandhi’s sister, Priyanka, and a relatively young leader, Mr Jyotiraditya Scindia—to spearhead its campaign but thus far their impact has been limited.

Part of the problem for leaders in the opposition, specifically in the Congress, is that when Mr Modi changed the rules of contesting elections, they were taken a bit by surprise. Mr Modi fought and won the 2014 elections by aggressive promotion of himself as the prime ministerial candidate; and by making specific promises about progress, development and improvement in the lives of Indians. It was like a presidential election where candidates project their personalities and their individual strengths to garner votes. In contrast, the Congress fought (and lost badly) the 2014 elections without even a declared candidate for the prime ministerial post. Mr Gandhi’s rallies were pale compared to Mr Modi’s thunderous ones. The leaders of the Congress, which is the only other national party of consequence other than the BJP, appear to contest elections the way the party did in the 1980s when it, for the large part, had no real challengers. That strategy is unlikely to work for it any longer.

The audience (read electorate) has changed. Exposure to digital and social media (which the BJP and its supporters deploy much more efficiently than other parties) have made India’s electorate a lot more aware and demanding. In such a context, the Congress’ style of using emotional appeal and the (fast fading) charisma of the Gandhi family can seem anachronistic. Many supporters of Congress point to the elevation and induction of Mr Gandhi’s sister, Priyanka, as a sort of trump card that the party could use in the coming elections but the fact is that she is quite untested in active politics—a newbie really if you discount her past activities, which have basically centred around nurturing and visiting the pocket boroughs of her family—her brother’s and her mother’s constituencies in UP.

As for the mainly regional parties that make up the so-called grand alliance of the opposition, none of their leaders enjoys a national stature that can be built or leveraged to position against Mr Modi. In such circumstances, and particularly in the aftermath of India’s skirmish with Pakistan, the advantage as Indians get ready to vote could seem to lie with Mr Modi and his allies.