Author: Sanjoy Narayan

Three Disturbing Trends That Could Derail India

By Sanjoy Narayan
Several disturbing trends have emerged in the country that do not bode well for the idea of India and the democratic values it has cherished for long

In a recent cover story, a leading Indian newsmagazine published an opinion poll, which found that a large majority of Indians think India’s Prime Minister, Mr Narendra Modi, towers above all other politicians and how for many of them, he evokes a sense of blind faith. The magazine’s cover headline blared: “Modistan” with a tagline that read “The nation is in the grip of Modimania. Indians believe he has all the answers.” According to the poll, Mr Modi’s approval ratings are sky high among respondents, making him the most popular Indian prime minister ever.

That cover story could indeed reflect the mood of the nation three months after Mr Modi and his party were re-elected in a sweeping electoral victory, but it also reflects the mood of much of Indian media, which has (with a few rare exceptions) been overtly effusive with its plaudits for the government and the Prime Minister. To keen observers of India’s current affairs, this could seem incongruous. While Mr Modi and his party decimated their political rivals—the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies won 353 of the 543 seats in the crucial lower house of Parliament—and for that they deserve the requisite accolades, several disturbing trends have emerged in the country that deserve sceptical analysis. Let’s look at just three of them.

The Indian Economy Is Ailing

In her first Budget recently, India’s new finance minister, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman, declared that India’s GDP would touch USD 5 trillion by 2025 (or double the current level of USD 2.7 trillion). If India has to achieve that target in six years, its economy has to grow at a nominal rate of 12% a year beginning now. Even to the gushiest supporters of India’s government that should look like a very tall order. Let’s view it from another angle: In order to achieve a GDP target of USD 5 trillion, India would require investments to the order of ₹100 lakh crore over the next five years.

Recently, India’s largest corporation, Reliance Industries, which is a massive conglomerate with interests in oil refining, petrochemicals, telecoms, retail, and a host of other major businesses, indicated that it was applying brakes on its investment spree and, presumably, consolidating its position across its businesses instead of expanding. An important rationale for corporate investment decisions is linked to the outlook that companies perceive for their businesses. If a large corporate entity such as Reliance decides to go slow on further investments, could it mean that it senses dark clouds on the horizon? And if Reliance decides to play it safe, could it mean that other, relatively smaller organisations may also follow suit?

Gloomy economic trends have already begun to show up. The Indian auto industry, which is often a good indicator of economic activity, particularly in the manufacturing sector, has already reported a slowdown in sales. Last month car sales declined 30% on a year-on-year basis, a sharp drop and the worst that the industry has seen in nearly 20 years. What is more, this is the ninth consecutive decline in monthly sales that the industry has witnessed. This could lead not only to a cap on further investments but also lay-offs and soaring inventory. Mr Modi’s “Make in India” scheme, which he launched in his first term as Prime Minister, aimed at increasing the share of the manufacturing sector from 16% of GDP to 25% by 2022 and at creating 100 million jobs in the sector. But thus far, the track record of job creation and investment has been far from encouraging, and if the auto sector’s travails are any indication, things could get worse.

The Rise Of Nationalism Is Alarming

Now, turn the focus to the trends emerging in Indian society and the cause for concern may seem serious. One of the hallmarks of India’s democracy has always been its pluralism. Few nations are as heterogenous—ethnically, religiously, linguistically, or culturally—as India is. Peaceful co-existence has always been cited as the glue that keeps a nation of 29 diverse states together. Of course, there have been separatist movements in India—in Kashmir, in Punjab, and in the demands (often acceded to by the government) for separate states based on different factors. Yet, the bedrock that has enabled India to fight Balkanisation of the kind that many other regions of the world have experienced, often accompanied by violent upheavals, has largely remained unmoved.

Such pluralistic values could now be at risk. These concerns stem from recent developments in two states—Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and Assam. Mr Modi’s government recently decided to revoke the statehood status of J&K and converting it to a Union Territory, which, for all practical purposes, means that it will be governed not by an elected state government but by a governor acting as a proxy for the central government in Delhi. Further, the special status that Kashmir has enjoyed under Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, will now be revoked. Since India’s Independence in 1947, Kashmir has been an area of dispute between India, Pakistan and China. The special status that it enjoyed thus far allowed Kashmir to have a separate constitution, a state flag and autonomy over the internal administration of the state, including things like granting citizenship, ownership of property, and fundamental rights.

Since 1989, Kashmir has witnessed a surge in militancy, much of which, India believes, is fuelled by cross-border terrorism from Pakistani territory, with benign or even active support of that neighbour-country’s military. Several wars have been fought with Pakistan over areas in the region that it occupies. And there have also been skirmishes with China over territory that the latter wants to appropriate. However, the special status to Kashmir is something that the largely Muslim population of that state has supported and would like to be continued. Currently, in the wake of the decision to revoke statehood and rescind the special status, Kashmir has been under what could be called a “communication curfew”—telecom links have been nearly completely blocked and local unrest is being tackled by the Indian military force.

While the rest of India’s largely Hindu population (80% of Indians are Hindus and 14% Muslims) may seem ambivalent about the goings on in Kashmir, bigger repercussions in the rest of the country could be imminent. Mr Modi’s party, the BJP, and his government are unabashedly pro-Hindu. In his first term (between 2014 and 2019), communal tensions, fuelled by instances of alleged cow slaughter by Muslims, or over disputed religious sites, sharply increased, sometimes culminating in violent confrontations and even a series of incidents where Muslims were lynched by members of the ultra-right-wing Hindu organisations. There is no guarantee that tensions in Kashmir will not spill over to the rest of India.

In Assam, on the eastern border of India, the government has imposed a registry of citizenship ostensibly to check illegal immigrants (mainly Muslims who have entered the country via Bangladesh). All residents of the state have to prove their Indian credentials before they can be allowed to stay in the country. This has led to a serious unrest, primarily because the implementation of the new law can be easily abused. Millions of Muslims risk being stripped of their Indian citizenship and being detained in camps as migrants, prior to possible extradition.

The gnawing fear is that such laws could be imposed across India in other states as well where the government believes illegal migrants have settled. If that happens, it could lead to explosive consequences. First, the implementation of such laws could be abused wantonly, and many legal immigrants could suffer. Second, it could further fuel already rampant anti-Muslim sentiments among sections of India’s majority community and lead to an undesirably hostile environment that would threaten the very idea of a pluralistic nation.

The Opposition And Media Are Neutered

In any democracy, a strong Opposition is as essential as a free press. Opposition parties keep a healthy check on governments, particularly those that are electorally as powerful as Mr Modi’s so that institutions such as the judiciary, the central bank, and other market regulators function fearlessly and independently. Likewise, a vibrant democracy deserves a free press that can ask questions of those in power and scrutinise the quality and fairness of governance. Unfortunately, in India, particularly after the past two parliamentary elections, the biggest Opposition parties have been decimated. The BJP’s main rival, the Congress party, which could win only 52 seats (a paltry percentage of the total of 543), is hobbled. Its president, Mr Rahul Gandhi, has resigned and signs of rebellion in its ranks have already emerged. Other political opponents of the BJP and its allies are mainly ones that have regional clout but not a national influence that could make a difference.

The Indian mainstream media, which has traditionally enjoyed freedom of expression, now appears to be a laughable caricature of itself. Leading newspapers, magazines and TV news channels have embraced sycophancy instead of objective scepticism when it comes to covering the government and its affairs. The government, which is a big advertiser providing revenues to media groups, has tacitly (and sometimes overtly) used this to influence editorial strategies. Such a trend is not just harmful to the quality of journalism but, eventually, to the core values of a democracy. And while “Modistan” makes for a catchy, eye-ball grabbing headline, it doesn’t really bode well for the idea of India and the democratic values that the nation has cherished for long.

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Press Freedom In India Is A Myth

By Sanjoy Narayan
The latest spate of restrictions on journalists may lead to other forms of control on media’s ability to report and comment fairly on government affairs

“Freedom of the Press,” George Orwell famously said, “if it means anything at all, means the freedom to criticize and oppose.” In the current context and events that appear to affect the Indian media that quote is most relevant. India’s press freedom is often touted as being high and its media landscape is described as being vibrant and versatile with print, news TV channels, and a burgeoning breed of online publications.

However, if you scratch beneath the superficial layers, the story is quite different. The newest developments are the biggest eye-openers. Recently, shortly after India’s new finance minister, Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman, presented the Union budget for 2019-20, she also announced a restriction on accredited members of the press on their access to her ministry’s officials in its New Delhi’s North Block offices. Journalists now will not be able to move around freely in the corridors of the ministry unless they have prior approved appointments.

Traditionally, accredited journalists have been allowed entry to government buildings and offices. At the finance ministry, as in most other government ministries, accredited journalists have for long been allowed entry to facilitate building contacts, developing vital sources among officials, and meeting their sources. A ban on such movements is tantamount to a serious curtailment of India’s press freedom. Ms. Sitharaman’s diktat was soon followed up by the announcement of restrictions on access to several other government buildings and offices in New Delhi.

In response to the finance minister’s directions, many publications first decided that they would boycott her official post-Budget dinner, a ritual that has been around for decades. However, it’s a reflection of Indian media’s current state that the boycott, for the most part, never actually happened. Journalists and editors from most of India’s largest publications and TV channels eventually attended the event and the Indian press has largely restrained itself from commenting on the restrictions in publications although the Editors Guild of India has called for their withdrawal.

These recent government directives are yet another blow to India’s press freedom, which has already been under siege. India’s press is not as free as it may seem. In the annual rankings for freedom of the press across the world, a well-respected list by Reporters Without Borders, a non-partisan, non-profit organisation, India ranks a lowly 140 among 180 countries. Indian journalists, particularly those working in small towns and semi-urban areas, routinely face violence, bans, and coercive pressures from politicians and local governments. In recent years, there have been many instances of fatal attacks against journalists.

The ability to freely access the offices of a democratically elected government is one of the basic aspects of press freedom. Journalism, especially when reporting or researching on government policies and other governance-related issues, cannot be a straitjacketed affair. Journalists gather information from various sources—some are by means of officially sanctioned meetings and on-record interviews but a lot of it is based on informal off-record or “background” conversations. Prohibiting journalists from accessing government buildings will seriously inhibit their work, and, therefore, the quality of what they are able to publish as stories. If the government decides who can meet its officials and when then the quality of reportage on the government’s affairs will be jeopardised.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has avoided meeting the press during his first inning in power. He did not hold press conferences; nor did he take with him a contingent of reporters on his frequent visits abroad. Traditionally, Indian prime ministers have always done so; and journalists got an opportunity to speak with them aboard the same aircraft or during and after summits and meetings. Of course, Mr Modi did agree to interviews with carefully selected editors (who asked questions that were usually pre-vetted by his office), but these happened to be at the end of his first term and just before he and his party contested the 2019 parliamentary elections and were by and large favourable or “positive” towards him and his government.

India’s media has been under pressure in other ways as well. Governments—both at the Centre and in the states—account for sizeable portions of the advertising revenues that media outlets earn. Government advertising is—for many small publications—the mainstay of revenue. And governments are known to use that factor to dictate how the editorial strategy concerning stories on government is adopted. This is an unhealthy trend, but reports suggest it is a growing trend.

Mr Modi’s government has been particularly prickly towards criticism in the media. The mainstream media, on the other hand, has been particularly favourable towards it in its reportage, editorial comments; and other coverage. Large media groups in India are almost entirely run as proprietorial enterprises and in many cases the proprietors have other business interests to protect. Sometimes those businesses depend on the government for contracts or even as a customer for their products and services. The conflicts of interest are obvious.

Many fear that the latest spate of restrictions on journalists could lead to other forms of control or pressures on media’s ability to report and comment fairly on government affairs. The protests by the Editors Guild notwithstanding, there has been no attempt by the government to rescind the restrictions. If free and fair journalism gets hobbled by government controls, it will be tantamount to compromising the democratic principles by which India lives. That brings us back to what Orwell said. A free media or freedom of the press is all about the freedom to criticise and oppose. Without that the press really means nothing.

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Apocalypse Now In India’s Cities?

By Sanjoy Narayan
The current water crisis in Chennai could be a foretaste of things to come across India as an estimated 600 million citizens face acute shortage and the groundwater reserves are fast depleting

It’s official. And it is also shocking. By 2020, which is next year, as many as 21 major Indian cities are likely to run out of their groundwater reserves. This, incidentally, is a finding from a report by the Indian government’s think tank, NITI Aayog, which was established to replace the erstwhile Planning Commission. The 21 cities include India’s capital city of New Delhi, its satellite growth centre, Gurugram, and several others smaller cities in northern India. But it also includes important southern cities such as Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and the seaside city of Chennai, which has been in the news now because of the severe water crisis it is facing currently.

Chennai’s four reservoirs that supply water have gone dry leading to an unprecedented crisis in India’s sixth largest metropolis, home to more than 10 million people. Images, videos and news items of the scale of suffering on account of water scarcity in Chennai have rung alarm bells not only across India but also around the world.  Coupled with the fact that the monsoons this year are running at a 43% shortfall, Chennai’s water crisis has been unprecedented in a city that chronically suffers on account of lack of that vital resource. It has resulted in long lines for tanker supply of water—which are not only inadequate but also expensive and can be afforded only by the very rich—and violent protests that could quickly turn into water riots.

The situation in Chennai could be a foretaste of things to come across India as an estimated 600 million Indians face water shortage. More than 40% of India’s water requirements come from groundwater reserves and these are fast depleting in its cities but also in rural India. In Gurugram and Delhi, part of the heavily populated National Capital Region, daily dependence on water shipped by tankers to condominiums, buildings and well-off neighbourhoods has become a routine affair. However, the prices for water delivered via tankers is soaring and only the affluent can afford to pay for it. In Chennai, for instance, A government water tanker costs Rs 700-Rs 800 for 9,000 litres, but supplies are scanty and private operators are making merry. Private tanker water prices have soared to Rs 4,000-Rs 5,000 for 900 litres, prices that are way beyond what an average Indian household could afford to pay.

At the root of India’s water crisis are several key factors. First, the increase in population and, hence, the soaring demand for water. India’s population runs at over 1.3 billion and is likely to soon overtake China’s. This has created tremendous pressures on cities and smaller towns where people migrate in search of earning a livelihood. Cities have been growing because of relentless building of legal as well as illegal settlements. This leads to unabated pumping out of groundwater and the water tables across the country are being depleted. Second, there is a combination of factors such as drying up of tanks and lakes because of increased demand and successive years of rainfall shortages. Desalination efforts by which seawater in coastal areas can be converted to potable water have been hopelessly inadequate and ineffective. Third, the governments and local administration, particularly in highly populated areas, have been short-sighted and their plans to mitigate or be prepared for water crises of the kind that is afflicting India now do not match the growth in demand.

What could this mean? Besides widespread suffering (in some cases, life threatening ones) it could be just a matter of time before water riots break out on the streets of Indian cities and towns. Last Friday, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council cited reports and estimates to describe what it termed as a “climate apartheid” where only the wealthy would be able to afford to counter and survive the effects of drought, overheating, and hunger. And a World Bank estimate suggests that climate change could push at least 120 million more people into poverty globally by 2030. In India, the situation is already hurtling towards that.

India’s Prime Minister, Mr Narendra Modi, recently called for greater measures for rainwater harvesting and more efficient ways of limiting water wastage. However, even if adopted, such measures could already be too late. A scenario where water becomes exorbitantly costly and leads to protests and violence is neither difficult to imagine nor unrealistic. And that could lead to civil strife of proportions that the authorities may not be equipped to handle.

A major cause of the crisis that Indians face with regard to basic infrastructure and resources such as water, electricity, and proper housing stems from the runaway surge in population. But it also has to do with the government’s lack of long-horizon planning. In most growing urban agglomerates in India, growth has been lop-sided and haphazard. Take the case of Gurugram. Touted as the “Millennium City”, it is the base for several Fortune 500 companies and has emerged as a go-to destination for wealthy Indians who can afford the sky-rocketing property prices and rents. However, in terms of basic infrastructure such as electricity, water, policing, and roads, it lags far behind what is required. When builders and real estate developers zeroed in on Gurugram, it was not matched by urban planning that would have to be commensurate with the growth that would come.

Today, Gurugram and several other Indian cities are in the throes of a crisis, teetering on the brink of a manmade disaster. The problem is so acute that solutions at this stage could be difficult to envisage. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 65% of India’s population is below the age of 35, and 50% below the age of 25. Millions of them are workforce eligible people with aspirations, longevity, and demands that need to be met. For any government, it is a Herculean challenge to face.

One solution could be to involve the private sector in collaborative strategies to fight the crisis. In areas such as water supply where the government’s wherewithal is limited and often inadequate, partnering with private enterprises and local communities could be one route towards solving the problem. If companies are provided incentives to partner the government in areas such as large-scale rainwater harvesting; distribution network for tanker water supplies; and limiting the surge in migration to cities (by making available livelihood opportunities in rural areas), things could take a turn for the better, or, at least, it could stem the spiralling fall towards disaster.

But even if such initiatives are adopted, they would be slow-burn processes that could take years, if not decades, before their effects are perceived. Meanwhile, in the short run, India’s cities—the situation in Chennai is a rude awakening—could be facing a doomsday-like situation.

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Union Home Minister's Challenges

Amit Shah Could Be The Most Decisive H.M. For India

By Sanjoy Narayan
Top three challenges before Union home ministry today are: Kashmir unrest, infiltration and Left extremism. If there is anyone who can decisively attempt to take on these challenges, it is Amit Shah

In elections such as the one that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won spectacularly in India recently, it is not always easy to zero in on a single person’s contribution to the victory. India’s electorate is massive (830 million people were eligible to vote in the recent polls); and it is diverse, spanning different demographics, cultures, languages, and socio-economic classes. Yet, one man’s contribution to the tsunami-like wave that gave the BJP 303 seats out of Lok Sabha’s 543 clearly stands out. And that is BJP’s president (and now India’s home minister), Mr Amit Shah.

Mr Shah is often described as being his party’s master strategist, a doer who is single-mindedly focused on tasks that are prioritised for him by his party and his leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In 2014 and 2019, that task was of winning the parliamentary elections. In both those, he excelled. He went about those tasks with meticulous planning and discipline, transforming the party into a well-oiled machine that has a dedicated, loyal, and hardworking cadre of workers at every echelon—from the national level; the state-levels; and down to district levels—across India. No other Indian political party has the sort of structure that the BJP, particularly its electioneering machinery, has.

Mr Shah’s efforts bore fruit. The BJP, which was considered to be a party whose support base was predominantly in the north, central and western India, has now spread its influence and garnered support in the east. In Bengal, in the 2019 elections, it won 18 seats out of a total of 42, a feat that surprised many analysts who may have been of the belief that the eastern bastion couldn’t be breached by the saffron party. The 303 seats that the BJP won show that its span of influence now covers much of India, except perhaps the south where it is still considered a northern party of Hindi-speakers and where regional parties dominate the political landscape. Yet, in the southern states, which account for 130 seats, the party and its allies won 30.

Mr Shah cut his teeth in politics in his home state of Gujarat where notably his tenure as home minister was marked by several controversies that led to skirmishes with the law (he was arrested and jailed in 2010 in connection with an alleged fake encounter killing by the police that had taken place when Shah was the state’s home minister). But when Mr Shah was inducted to the upper house of India’s Parliament in 2017, Prime Minister Modi is believed to have told his party’s legislators: “Amit Shahji ke (Parliament mein) aane se aap ke mauj-masti ke din samaapt ho gaye hain.’’ (After Amit Shah has come to Parliament, your days of fun and relaxation are over). That probably is an apt indicator of the kind of political leader Shah is: a highly motivated, result-oriented taskmaster who doesn’t shy away from being tough.

As home minister, Mr Shah will have lots of opportunities for big tasks and equally big challenges. Topmost on his agenda could likely be Jammu & Kashmir where there has been no elected government in charge after the coalition between the BJP and the regional People’s Democratic Party (PDP) broke down and the government collapsed. Elections in the troubled state have not been held as militant separatists are still active and terrorist attacks from across the western border with Pakistan have far from abated. The trouble in Kashmir, which enjoys several autonomous rights that are different from other Indian states, has been festering for more than two decades, and a solution has eluded most government regimes at the Centre. Bringing peace back to Kashmir and ensuring that elections can take place there peacefully is something that will test Mr Shah’s skills to their limit, yet many think that he could probably be the only person in Mr Modi’s government decisive enough to find a solution in the state.

Before the elections were held this year, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) was introduced in Assam with the objective of screening out illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries and find ways of repatriating them to their countries. It is a controversial move, but Mr Shah is a strong advocate of it. The problem of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh or other places is, however, not restricted to Assam. Other eastern states such as Bengal, Bihar and Odisha are equally affected by such influxes. And, illegal Bangladeshi immigrants exist all over India, notably in northern India. Mr Shah could possibly think of extending the register now being implemented in Assam to other states. That sort of a move would likely invite opposition and controversy, especially regarding the possibility of its misuse, but those are things that have rarely bothered him.

Mr Shah’s main advantage—besides his amply proven skills as a strategist and implementer—is the full backing of Prime Minister Modi that he enjoys. The two men enjoy a chemistry that is rare in political relationships. Mr Shah has been Mr Modi’s trusted lieutenant since the latter’s innings as chief minister in Gujarat. And, thereafter, when he was the prime ministerial candidate in 2014, as his chief election strategist. Later, after he became president of the party, Mr Shah and Mr Modi worked in tandem. The pair have been highly effective as the results of the 2019 elections demonstrated recently. Many believe as home minister, Mr Shah will wield more power and have greater clout than any other cabinet minister in Mr Modi’s government.

The other task that Mr Shah will have will be to quash extreme leftist militancy in parts of India, particularly in Chhattisgarh but also in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Left extremist hideouts in these regions have been a tough nut to crack for successive previous home ministers and, although attacks and ambushes on security forces aren’t frequent, when they occur, they take a heavy toll. In early May this year, more than a dozen security personnel died in Gadchiroli (Maharashtra) and several of their vehicles burnt. These guerrilla-style attacks need to be checked but many believe the root of the problem lies deeper. The regions where extremism thrives are typically impoverished tribal areas and a lasting solution would need to combine both, strikes at extremist groups and implementing plans to improve the lot of the local population in these areas.

Unrest in Kashmir, rampant infiltration from across India’s borders, and left extremist violence have never been easy problems to tackle. Governments in the past, including Mr Modi’s previous regime, have faltered on all of these. It is perhaps with that in mind that Mr Modi anointed Mr Shah as his home minister. If there is anyone who can decisively attempt to take on these challenges, it is him.

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Modi IN combative MOOD

Modi Must Tackle These Real Issues

By Sanjoy Narayan
In his second term, Mr Modi will have much more to deal with than have his party gloat and boast about how many seats it can win in 2024

The second lead story in an Indian national daily newspaper recently quoted a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader proudly proclaiming that in the 2024 parliamentary elections, the party wants to win 333 of the 543 Lok Sabha seats. That is the kind of braggadocio that the BJP needs to avoid. The BJP recently won 303 seats in the recent elections, topping its 2014 tally of 282. Now, it wants more. Greedy proclamations of that sort are exactly the things that the BJP should avoid. Its performance in the past two elections have been spectacular with its prime mover, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, emerging as the strongest political leader that India has seen in a long time.

ALSO READ: Modi India’s Best Hope Despite Liberal Hostility

Yet, the BJP and its leaders must shun all urges to gloat over its recent victory. True, it has decimated the Opposition parties, chiefly the Congress, which is in shambles. It has humbled well-entrenched regional parties, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, both places where it has wrested seats against big odds. But now, as Mr Modi embarks on his second innings, there are more important things for him and his party to focus on. In his second term, Mr Modi and his government’s performance will face greater scrutiny than it did in the first. The people have spoken with their ballots and given him a renewed lease on the government but now he will have to deliver. Here are some of what the new government must put on top of its agenda. They are about economics and politics, but they have little to do with setting targets now to get more seats in 2024.

Economics. Through NDA-I’s five years, Mr Modi himself, his ministers and other officials in his administration have always maintained that the economy has been in fine fettle. Much of that claim is hot air. India’s GDP growth rate, often mentioned as being the highest in the world in recent years, is based on a revised methodology on a new base figure that many believe has artificially enhanced the official rate to higher than it actually is. India, the sixth largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.62 trillion, does not have a proper system to measure employment rates. True, large a swathe of Indian enterprise is informal and undocumented but in 2019 not being able to precisely tell how many people are employed is ridiculous.

ALSO READ: Six Things To Expect If Modi Returns To Power

Employment generation is without doubt the main task that any Indian government must focus on. According to some estimates, India’s unemployment rates have touched the highest in 45 years during the Modi 1.0 regime. Sixty-five percent of India’s 1.3 billion people are below the age of 35. A large proportion of them is youth of working age. Estimates of how many people are added annually to the numbers of those seeking jobs varies between 5 and 12 million. In contrast, the number of jobs generated annually is a small fraction of those numbers—doesn’t matter if you take the lower or the higher one as the base. In many instances, Mr Modi and his colleagues in the government have been in denial about their track record in employment generation. It is a time bomb that is ticking away and, eventually, it could have electoral consequences.

A lasting solution to India’s agricultural economy is another task that needs urgent attention. Well into the 21st century, nearly three-quarters of India’s population depends on agriculture but the sector’s share in GDP is just 17% and declining. The fact is India’s rural youth have to live on farms toil away at unremunerative and unproductive tasks because there are no other jobs available for them.

Mr Modi, in his first term, launched several catchy-sounding schemes—some were to create universal banking; others to hone the skills of young Indians so that they were employable; and yet others with the objective of increasing investments (and, hence, hopefully, employment) in the manufacturing sector. None of these has achieved results that are anywhere close to the targets that were promised. In his second term, tackling and solving these economic problems have to be Mr Modi’s topmost priority. Otherwise, India will be sitting on a tinder box ready to explode.

Politics. Political pundits in India are a dime a dozen. Indian editors and journalists who scoured the length and breadth of the country to ostensibly gauge the mood of the electorate horribly mis-predicted the outcome of the election with none (except for a few exit polls done by psephologists) getting anywhere close to the numbers that the BJP won. But the BJP’s politics, as the often-vicious electoral campaign this year bore out, is one of divisiveness. Its majoritarian tack has made India’s minorities (of its population of 1.3 billion, 14.2% are Muslims, and in absolute terms that is a huge number) insecure and anxious. A second term could strengthen those in the right-wing nationalist organisations (read: BJP, RSS and the Sangh Parivar’s other constituents) that are inclined towards hard-handed treatment to minority communities. This cannot be allowed to happen. In his second term Mr Modi ought not to keep silent (as he has largely been) when there are instances of violence, discrimination, and worse perpetrated by cohorts that swear allegiance to him and his party. The hard-handed treatment should be reserved for those cohorts and not their targets.

ALSO READ: India’s Fissiparous Politics, An Essay

If Mr Modi, as he and his colleagues often proclaim, want the BJP’s footprints to spread—in the east, the north-east, and the south, he would also have to get a buy-in in terms of regional interests. That would mean assessing, appraising, and understanding the special needs of different regions of India—not just the northern Hindi-dominated states. There have been little signs of that during Modi 1.0. In his second term, he will have to carry those regions with him by more empathetic strategies and policies.

International relations. Just before the elections this year, India sparred with its neighbour and arch enemy, Pakistan, and used the airborne sorties, surgical strikes aimed at alleged terrorist centres, all combined with high doses of jingoism, to try and score electoral points. That does not help India’s relations with Pakistan. Nor does it solve the dispute between the two countries over the northern state of Kashmir. Mr Modi will have to think out of the box when it comes to dealing with Pakistan, which is by itself a troubled state where the army, militant terrorist groups and others hold the government to ransom. India, as the much larger state, has to devise diplomatic strategies that go beyond the chest-thumping rhetoric that hawks on either side of the border favour.

Elsewhere in the world, Mr Modi will have to deal with powerful China, which is building roads and sea routes in India’s part of the world that could hem in India—both economically as well as in terms of security. IN Modi 1.0 we saw media-friendly visits, gestures, and other cosmetic (and mainly ineffectual) in the name of diplomacy with China. India is puny in terms of defence and economic capabilities compared to China. It has to think on its toes when it comes to dealing with that nation and keep its own interests rather than photo ops in mind. Ditto for the US and Russia, two other powerful global powers whose foreign policies have changed quite radically. If India is to make a mark on the global arena and get its due in terms of recognition and of economic benefits, it has to have far more effective plans of dealing with such powers.

In his second term, Mr Modi will have much more to tackle than have his party gloat and boast about how many seats it can win in 2024. There’s a lot to do in the five years till then.

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Narendra Modi At Rally

Six things to expect if Modi comes back as PM

By Sanjoy Narayan
A Modi regime 2.0 could mean changes with far-reaching consequences for India

When the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) national general secretary Ram Madhav in a recent interview with Bloomberg News’ editor-in-chief said that his party would require the support of its allies to form a government, there was much elation among the BJP’s baiters and opponents. Madhav merely said that his party would be happy if it won 271 of India’s 543 parliamentary seats and he forecasted that with the support of its allies, the National Democratic Alliance (a coalition that the BJP leads) would get a comfortable majority in the House for which elections are ongoing.

Five of the seven phases of India’s national election have been completed, and after the remaining two are done, the results are expected to be announced on May 23. But when Madhav hinted that the BJP was unlikely to get a majority by itself (in 2014, it had won 282 seats), the opponents of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party viewed it as some kind of admission of defeat. The thing is many observers, including journalists who have scoured the vast nation during the ongoing elections, have been reporting that although Mr Modi and the BJP have a distinct edge over their opponents, a voting wave of the sort that favoured them in 2014 is unlikely to be repeated. But the BJP and its allies could win the mandate to form the government again—with, presumably, Mr Modi as their Prime Minister for the second term.

Such predictions are fraught with the risk of being proved wrong—India’s elections have always been notoriously difficult to predict because of the country’s vastness and its complex diversities. Yet, many wonder what to expect if Mr Modi is back in power in New Delhi for another five years. His staunchest critics fear that it could unleash a regime of authoritarianism that could raise the insecurity that minorities, including the nation’s Muslims, who account for 14% of the population, face. Some believe the authority and autonomy of institutions such as the judiciary and fiscal regulators could get compromised by his government’s political interests.

A lot would depend on the margin of majority that the BJP (with or without its allies) are able to muster up in the ongoing election. If their margin of victory is not too slender, it could mean a strengthening of the Modi government 2.0’s ambit of power. Here are some of the ways in which such a phenomenon could manifest itself:

  1. More control over India’s media sector? In last year’s World Press Freedom Index rankings (compiled by the non-profit, Reporters Without Borders) of 180 countries, India was placed at a lowly 138 (China was 176 and North Korea 180). It is widely accepted that albeit its noisy, cacophonous, and crowded nature, India’s mainstream media is not exactly free. Media owners are compromised in many different ways and the content they publish is often compromised—either through self-censorship or fear of governmental retribution. The new wave of emerging digital publications are, however, still free; and many of them are vocal critics of Mr Modi and his government. If his regime returns to power, one could expect stricter controls for the digital media, and, of course, continued influence over older, mainstream media.
  2. Constitutional and other changes? As has been evident in the past five years, Mr Modi’s style of governance borders on the presidential style that is in vogue in many large nations—including the US. Mr Modi also wields considerable power, often unilateral, over his cabinet and council of ministers. For him to move toward a presidential form of democracy where people elect the president as the head of the executive (and not a titular position as exists now) may not come as a surprise. Mr Modi is an admirer of China’s President Xi Jinping; and of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, both politicians that rule with an iron hand and overwhelming control. Of course, China’s isn’t a democratic government like India’s is but with a sort of presidential system in place, the top boss of the executive could get to wield considerably greater powers as an individual.
  3. Further weakening of institutions? India’s central bank; its state-owned banks; its higher educational institutions; and research centres already face noticeable degrees of government interference. Vice-chancellors and other key appointments at educational institutions are often politically decided. There are instances to show that syllabuses, grants, funding, and courses, including areas of research, are often influenced by the government through its education and other related ministries. Such a trend could intensify in a second Modi regime. As could the interference of government in monetary policy. During Mr Modi’s first tenure as Prime Minister, the central bank, RBI, witnessed the exit of a high-profile and globally reputed governor, Dr Raghuram Rajan, ostensibly because he refused to toe the line of Mr Modi’s finance ministry. Many fear that a return of his government could lead to even higher government control over monetary policy.
  4. Changes in the way the judiciary functions? India’s judiciary follows the collegium system, which is based on a principle of judicial independence. This means the appointment of judges can be decided only by the judiciary without any interference from the legislature or the executive. The government, during Mr Modi’s regime, attempted to change this by setting up the National Judicial Appointments Committee (NJAC) under an Act of Parliament. However, the act was quashed by the Supreme Court, which restored the collegium system. If Mr Modi’s regime returns, many believe the NJAC could be revived. If it does, the appointment of judges, in theory at least, could be subject to external influences, namely from the government.
  5. More strident discrimination against minorities? It is widely acknowledged that the minority communities in India have witnessed sharpened discrimination during the past five years. Violence and instances of lynching related to cow slaughter, besides other forms of discrimination, have increased against religious and other minorities. Many fear that the fringe elements in the majority community could get a further boost if a BJP-led government returns to power. The National Register of Citizens, which is a register of all “genuine” Indian citizens in Assam, or a form of it could also be introduced in other states, especially those that share a border with foreign countries.
  6. Impact on the future of Kashmir? The state of Kashmir is empowered with a special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. For all matters other than defence, foreign affairs, finance and communication, Parliament needs the state government’s concurrence to apply other laws. The state also decides on residents’ citizenship status; property rights; and fundamental rights. The BJP has been opposing this special status to the state. In the context of the continued dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, the return of the Modi regime could see revival of the move to abolish Article 370, which could lead to an upheaval in the state.
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BJP HImmatnagar Rally

6 States That Could Make Or Break Modi

By Sanjoy Narayan
The BJP tally in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan will decide how it fares in 2019 Lok Sabha elections

Plumb in the middle of India’s seven-phase mega national elections, the prevailing mood is one that is marked palpably by confusion. India’s elections have often proved to be notoriously unpredictable. The tsunami-like wave that Mr Narendra Modi rode on to win in 2014 had taken everyone—including the most seasoned Indian psephologists—completely by surprise. It isn’t different this time. No one appears to have a clue. Journalists scouring the length and breadth of the country report widely divergent readings of the mood of India’s 820-million strong voters. Some say Prime Minister Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could return to power, albeit with less than the overwhelming majority it won last time (in 2014, the BJP won 282 of 543 seats; and along with its allies, its tally was 336). Others say the people’s verdict could result in an indecisive outcome with the united opposition, led by the Congress, eating into the BJP’s vote shares.

There are six states though that could decide the fate of the BJP: Uttar Pradesh, which has the highest number of parliamentary seats (80); Maharashtra (48), Bihar (40), Madhya Pradesh (29), Gujarat (26), and Rajasthan (25). That makes for a total of 248 seats; in 2014, the BJP won 194 of them. In other states with a large number of parliamentary constituencies, such as Bengal (42), and Andhra Pradesh and Telangana (which together have 42), and the three southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka (which together account for 87 seats), the BJP’s footprint is still weak and it will have to depend on the electoral strength of its allies in order to add to the National Democratic Alliance coalition that it leads. Moreover, in some of these states, the regional parties (viz. the Trinamool Congress in Bengal; and the AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu) hold sway with the national parties, BJP and Congress, having much less sway among voters.

So, much of how the BJP fares in the ongoing elections will depend on how many seats it gets to win in the six states that powered its victory in 2014. In three of them—UP, Maharashtra, and Bihar—where the BJP won handsomely in 2014, this time around it faces a stiff fight. In Uttar Pradesh, the two regional parties, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), usually daggers drawn, have forged a surprise alliance to fight against the BJP.

In Bihar, the Congress, which got battered in the 2014 national elections (it got a total of 44 seats), has tied up with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). In Maharashtra, where the BJP has an alliance with the regional Shiv Sena, the tie-up has been under strain. Notably, in UP, the alliance between the SP and BSP covers a swathe of castes and religious communities—the SP has the support of the Muslims and the Yadavs while the BSP, led by Mayawati, has the support of the Dalits and other backward castes. In Bihar, the Congress and RJD, contesting together, could prove to be a formidable challenger to the BJP.

ALSO READ: Do Regional Parties Hold Key To Next Govt?

In Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, in recent assembly elections, the Congress was able to win and form the state governments. That could be a critical factor in determining who the voters in those states would choose in the national elections, giving the Congress an edge in the choice. In 2014, the BJP won 71 of the 80 seats in UP; 22 of the 40 in Bihar; all of the 26 seats in Gujarat; 23 of the 48 in Maharashtra; 27 of the 29 in Madhya Pradesh; and all 25 in Rajasthan.

This time, things could be much tougher for it. The BJP and its allies would need 272 seats in the 543-strong Parliament in order to decisively win. But, although Mr Modi and his party are hoping to get extra numbers from Bengal, Odisha and some of the southern states to make up for the losses in the six crucial states, it is not something it can bank on. The regional parties in these states are formidably strong, with some such as the Trinamool Congress having deep, cadre-based support bases.

In the six states that powered its 2014 victory, the BJP has taken steps to garner support in the face of a stronger opposition. In UP, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, it has tried to woo the non-Yadav and other backward classes by according the status of a constitutional body to the National Commission for Other Backward Classes, which decides on job reservations for India’s most backward classes. It has also tried to alleviate the apprehensions of the poorer sections of India’s upper castes (who fear discrimination when it comes to jobs) by reserving 10% of jobs for upper-caste people coming under the “economically weaker section”.

But still the going will be tough for Mr Modi’s party. In UP, the BSP-SP alliance is strong and theoretically covers a large swathe of castes and communities. For instance, Muslims who have remained almost universally apprehensive of Mr Modi’s government will be unlikely to vote for the BJP or any of its allies.

ALSO READ: It It Advantage Modi?

In two of the six crucial states, however, the BJP could leverage Mr Modi’s own popularity. In a TV interview recently, Mr Modi boasted: “Modi hi Modi ko challenge kiya hai” (Modi is the only challenger to Modi). In states such as Maharashtra and Gujarat, his popularity could translate into regional waves of support when people cast their votes. But in the recent state assembly election in Gujarat, while the BJP won and formed the government, the Congress fared better in terms of the number of votes it managed to get. And, in Maharashtra, where its fate will be partly governed by the support extended by its partner, the Shiv Sena, the two have had regular spats in recent years, differing over many issues.

Many believe that in 2014, when the BJP won 194 seats in the six mentioned states, it had exhausted the maximum number that it could have hoped for from those. And that a repeat of that performance now looks unlikely.

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Woman Holds Narendra Modi Cutout

Is It Advantage Modi Before The Elections Begin?

By Sanjoy Narayan
Even before the first vote is cast, and campaigning reaches its crescendo, Modi is probably entering the fray with an advantage.

A few days ago, one of India’s most respected and well-known senior TV journalists posted a tweet that was telling. She was reporting from the field in Baghpat in Uttar Pradesh and her tweet said: “A commonly described refrain about @narendramodi–not Pulwama, Balakot, or PM Kisan–is “he works really hard and he isn’t gaining anything for himself” – talking to voters in Baghpat. #OnTheRoad2019”. India’s national elections are less than a fortnight away and, increasingly, the views gleaned from the ground seem to point to a public mood that favours re-electing Mr Narendra Modi, his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and its several allies.

Dipstick surveys of the sort that journalists often resort to—talking to local cab drivers or roadside tea stall owners is one of the commonest tactics they use—are neither rigorous nor scientific ways of gauging the pre-election mood of an electorate, at least not of one that is as diverse, complex, and confounding as that of India’s. Yet, as we head for this year’s national elections (they begin on April 11 and go on for seven phases), what people outside the high-decibel chatter on social media platforms are saying bears consideration. Mr Modi and his government appear to elicit greater levels of faith among large swathes of India’s population. So, are they headed towards an election with a definite edge over their opponents such as the Congress party or the motley crew of other parties that have been trying to forge a grand alliance to oust the BJP-led government?

When it comes to campaigning for votes Mr Modi has a clear edge over his rivals. Whatever critics say, he’s probably the best orator in Indian politics today. His speeches may be peppered with “politically incorrect” statements (recently, while speaking to students at an IIT, he appeared to be mocking Congress president Rahul Gandhi as someone suffering from dyslexia), or repetitive homilies about how his government had delivered on what it had promised, or even inaccurate accounts of things such as India’s growth, employment generation, and poverty alleviation during his regime, but his oratorical skills are clearly a huge draw among ordinary Indians who usually come out in strength to listen to him at his numerous rallies. The average Indian sees Mr Modi as a strong, hardworking leader who is honest and selfless.

A gifted speaker, Mr Modi’s rally speeches are designed to touch the heart of his audiences. He speaks to them in simple language, although he has a penchant for coining acronyms, and is usually able to create a feeling of respect, admiration and trust among them. Through his tenure, he has leveraged this talent. His monthly radio talk, Mann ki Baat, which partly crowd sources its themes, and has a potential to reach 90% of Indians, is a huge hit. He has nearly 47 million followers on Twitter and has posted more than 22,800 tweets (Donald Trump has 59.5 million and 41,000 tweets) and even though he’s faced flak for not holding a single press conference since he became Prime Minister in 2014, his alternative way of keeping in contact with people seems to have borne fruit. No one except the media complains about the PM not holding pressers.

In several polls, confidence trackers and other devices of that ilk, Mr Modi continues to be head and shoulders ahead of his rival politicians when it comes to who most people would prefer to see as the leader of their nation. In contrast, the Congress president and Mr Modi’s main rival, Mr Gandhi, is still seen as a work in progress. That may seem amusing because at 48, Mr Gandhi may be a generation younger than Mr Modi, 68, but he’s already a middle-aged man.  Mr Gandhi’s election speeches are also not remarkable. He’s not as good a public speaker. But more importantly, his speeches lack the conviction that Modi’s speeches invariably seem to have. Also, during this election season, other than the announcement of a form of universal basic income for the poorest in India, in his public utterances, there has been little of his vision for a better India.

Mr Gandhi’s party just released its manifesto for the elections, spelling out what it would do if it came to power. It was no surprise that it promised a thorough investigation into the Modi government’s deal to buy Rafale fighter jets from France—a deal that the Congress and others believe smacks of corruption. But its main focus was on creating jobs; alleviating distress among India’s farmers; and, naturally, the minimum income scheme that Mr Gandhi had announced earlier, and in which Rs 72,000 a year would be paid to the poorest 20% of households.

The BJP is yet to release its manifesto—before the last election in 2014, it had done so only very late into the campaigning period. But it would be a real surprise if that document didn’t prioritise the exact same things that the Congress’s one has. The Modi government has been perceived to be tardy on issues such as employment generation and well-being of farmers. Political prudence would dictate that these issues would feature high up on the BJP’s manifesto as well. India’s problems—particularly on the economic development front are complex and so large that no aspirant for New Delhi’s seat of power can ignore them, least of all an aspirant wanting to be re-elected.

The outcome of India’s elections—they are complex and involve various permutations and factors that influence voters’ choices—are never predictable. The size and scale of itself is massive: 820 million voters; 930,000 polling stations; 1.4 million electronic voting machines; 11 million security personnel overseeing polling over seven phases. But so is the unpredictability of the voting trends. How a party fares in populous states such as Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh (now bifurcated into two separate states), and Maharashtra could be the determinant of whether it gets a shy at forming the government. Moreover, votes are cast on the basis of many other factors that go beyond economics and the personalities of leaders. Caste and religion create blocs of voters; and India’s population of 172 million Muslims who are its largest minority have not exactly been happy in the past five years under a government led by a party whose policies have always had Hindu nationalism at its core. Recently, at one of his rallies, while upbraiding the Congress for creating the term “Hindu terror”, Mr Modi implied Mr Gandhi was contesting from an additional Muslim-dominated constituency because he was afraid of losing from his regular constituency, UP’s Amethi. In 2014, when the BJP and its allies won 336 seats out of 543 in India’s lower house of Parliament, few psephologists had been able to predict that it would be such an overwhelming win. One reason why India’s pre-poll surveys often go horribly wrong is because of the diversity and sheer size of the electorate—huge numbers of voters; and a vastly diverse population, both in terms of demographics and psychographics. In a country of 1.3 billion, sometimes the biggest sample size you can manage to poll is quite often just not big enough. Yet, even before the first vote is cast, and election campaigning reaches its crescendo, it may not be wrong to say that Mr Modi is probably entering the fray with an advantage.

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Indo-Pak Skirmish And Its Inevitable Political Fallout

By Sanjoy Narayan

In the early 2000s, not long after the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, which took hundreds, if not thousands of lives, but in which India claimed a decisive victory, we invited a hawkish Indian defence analyst and expert over to the magazine that I was then editing. The idea was to get his opinion on India’s preparedness for armed conflict in the region, particularly with the prevailing hostile relations with Pakistan and a potentially hostile and powerful neighbour like China. The expert (who will have to remain unnamed for now) was good. His knowledge was vast and insightful but being a hawk, his lecture and the subsequent discussions were burnished with aggressive posturing with the key point being that India was certainly in a stronger position vis-à-vis Pakistan and with greater political will it could teach an errant neighbour some hard home truths.

It was an invigorating discussion that opened up our fairly young editorial team’s minds to issues of strategy, defence, and armed conflict. But, following the talk, it was the afterglow that seemed take hold of many of my colleagues I remember vividly. Otherwise rational and perfectly reasonable young men and women strutted about the newsroom with aggressive posturing, some loudly lamenting that the Indian government was shying away from confronting Pakistan and that our armed forces should initiate military action against that nation and teach it a sound lesson.

That sort of sentiment seems to be swirling around in India now in the aftermath of the recent skirmish with Pakistan. Last month terrorists believed to be based in Pakistan suicide-bombed an Indian convoy in Kashmir and killed at least 40 security personnel. India retaliated by sending in warplanes to bomb what it claims to be a large terrorist training centre and camp in Pakistan. This was followed by an airstrike by Pakistan and dogfights in which one Indian plane was downed and a pilot captured. The pilot was released by Pakistan, which refuted India’s claims of decimating the terrorist hideout and took the high moral ground by offering peace dialogues with India over the disputed region of Kashmir.

But the main fallout of last month’s conflict was the chest-beating brand of patriotism that it spawned and the political capital that the current regime led by Mr Narendra Modi is drawing out of it. Mr Modi, his colleagues, and supporters have been proudly proclaiming the decisiveness of the Indian attack (never mind that the actual damage may have been much less than the claims that hundreds of terrorists had perished during the attack). Otherwise reasonable people in civil society as well as India’s noisy and colourful media have earned a sort of bragging rights over the skirmish, and some of them have even been baying for Pakistan’s blood. With less than a month left before millions of Indians head towards polling booths to cast their votes in the national elections, this mood is significant.

It is significant because Mr Modi, his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its allies are quite resolved to making the newest incidence of tension between India and Pakistan into an election issue. Dipstick surveys will likely show that the electorate’s faith in Mr Modi has strengthened as a consequence of the conflict. But what may be more important is the impact (or rather the lack of it) on those who politically oppose Mr Modi. In the past few months opposition leaders, including those of the Congress party and a host of other regional groupings, have been trying to forge an alliance aimed at ousting Mr Modi and his party during the coming elections. Several fault-lines, however, have emerged in that endeavour: there is no clear leader of the opposition alliance that can command support of the motley assemblage of parties; the political ambitions of several regional leaders are seen to be colliding against each other; and there is no clear-cut common electoral strategy that seems to have emerged.

More seriously, the opposition appears to be more than just a bit stumped by the wave of nationalistic fervour that Mr Modi and his alliance have drummed up. In the prevailing environment of patriotic pride and hawkishness towards Pakistan expressing any criticism (or even mild differences of opinion) is fraught with the risks of being labelled “anti-national”, which, with elections around the corner, can prove to be disastrous for anyone with political ambitions. Even mild questioning by some Congress leaders of BJP president Amit Shah’s claim that more than 250 terrorists had died in India’s bombing of a site in Pakistan led to counter-attacks by the BJP that labelled the Congress as being anti-India.

The problem for the opposition parties is compounded by the fact that little has emerged from their side in the form of a cogent, coherent strategy that can be part of their electoral campaign. In spite of a plethora of issues that have plagued the Modi regime—lack of jobs; distress in the farm sector; irregularities in a major arms deal such as the one for acquiring Rafale fighter jets from France; and growing insecurity among India’s minorities—besides criticism, the opposition parties haven’t been seen proffering their solutions for such problems. The Congress’ president, Mr Rahul Gandhi, is visibly more active politically than he has ever been. In Uttar Pradesh, a state which accounts for the largest number of seats in India’s Parliament and which will play a crucial role in deciding the outcome of the elections, the Congress has a new team—Mr Gandhi’s sister, Priyanka, and a relatively young leader, Mr Jyotiraditya Scindia—to spearhead its campaign but thus far their impact has been limited.

Part of the problem for leaders in the opposition, specifically in the Congress, is that when Mr Modi changed the rules of contesting elections, they were taken a bit by surprise. Mr Modi fought and won the 2014 elections by aggressive promotion of himself as the prime ministerial candidate; and by making specific promises about progress, development and improvement in the lives of Indians. It was like a presidential election where candidates project their personalities and their individual strengths to garner votes. In contrast, the Congress fought (and lost badly) the 2014 elections without even a declared candidate for the prime ministerial post. Mr Gandhi’s rallies were pale compared to Mr Modi’s thunderous ones. The leaders of the Congress, which is the only other national party of consequence other than the BJP, appear to contest elections the way the party did in the 1980s when it, for the large part, had no real challengers. That strategy is unlikely to work for it any longer.

The audience (read electorate) has changed. Exposure to digital and social media (which the BJP and its supporters deploy much more efficiently than other parties) have made India’s electorate a lot more aware and demanding. In such a context, the Congress’ style of using emotional appeal and the (fast fading) charisma of the Gandhi family can seem anachronistic. Many supporters of Congress point to the elevation and induction of Mr Gandhi’s sister, Priyanka, as a sort of trump card that the party could use in the coming elections but the fact is that she is quite untested in active politics—a newbie really if you discount her past activities, which have basically centred around nurturing and visiting the pocket boroughs of her family—her brother’s and her mother’s constituencies in UP.

As for the mainly regional parties that make up the so-called grand alliance of the opposition, none of their leaders enjoys a national stature that can be built or leveraged to position against Mr Modi. In such circumstances, and particularly in the aftermath of India’s skirmish with Pakistan, the advantage as Indians get ready to vote could seem to lie with Mr Modi and his allies.